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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Substantial Similarity Between Video
Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New
Medium*
I. INTRODUCTION
Video games have revolutionized the entertainment industry
in just a few short years by developing into an enormously profita-
ble business.' The young video game industry has suffered a vari-
ety of growing pains, such as litigation over harsh state and local
government regulation of video game purveyors, parental fear that
playing games may harm children,' and public outcry against the
propriety of marketing video games that contain sexually explicit
or other objectionable subject matter.4
These problems, however, do not constitute as severe a threat
to video game companies as does competition from video games
* The author entered a version of this Recent Development in the Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition, August, 1983.
1. Home video game sales totalled $2.1 billion in 1982 and constituted 31% of total
toy industry sales, up from 19% in 1981. In addition, arcade video game revenues amounted
to approximately $6 billion in 1982. Leaf, Video Makes-and-Breaks Toy Industry, 56 ELEC-
TRONICS 84, 84-85 (Feb. 24, 1983).
2. See Note, First Amendment Protection of Artistic Entertainment: Toward Reason-
able Municipal Licensing and Zoning Regulation of Video Games, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1223
(1983); Recent Development, State Regulation of Electronic Game Machines, 11 J. L. &
EDuc. 385 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Wanner, The Electronic Bogeyman, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1982, at 8;
Markey, What's New, Pac-Man?, McCALLS, Sept. 1982, at 152.
4. See, e.g., Graham, Custer May Be Shot Down Again in a Battle of the Sexes Over
X-Rated Video Games, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Nov. 15, 1982, at 114 (the objective of game enti-
tled "Custer's Revenge" is to guide a facsimile of General Custer across obstacle filled ter-
rain to a graphically explicit sexual encounter with an Indian woman); Sink the Frey
Bentos!, TImE, Apr. 26, 1982, at 55 (the objective of game entitled "Obliterate," which a




that illegally infringe the copyrights of popular game models.' The
recent spate of video game copyright litigation has presented the
federal courts' with the challenge of properly applying the 1976
Copyright Act7 (the "1976 Act") to this new medium of expression.
Although Congress apparently did not design the 1976 Act
with video games in mind,8 Congress did intend that courts apply
the 1976 Act with reasonable flexibility toward new technologies.'
Thus, courts have faced a variety of imaginative arguments advo-
cating that video games not receive copyright protection but unan-
imously have rejected them.10 A more difficult copyright issue for
courts has been deciding whether one video game illegally has cop-
ied another. Of the cases involving illegal video game copying that
courts presently have decided, only Atari, Inc. v. North American
Philips Consumer Electric Corp." has found copyright infringe-
ment by a video game that was not virtually identical1 2 to the orig-
inal game.
Part II of this Recent Development discusses the requirement
in copyright infringement actions that, in proving copying, a defen-
dant's allegedly infringing work must be substantially similar to a
plaintiff's copyrighted work. Part II first discusses the common law
idea-expression principle's and the scenes a faire doctrine's limita-
tion on finding substantial similarity between two works. Part H
then discusses judicial tests for ascertaining whether two works are
5. Infringing games "pose a substantial threat to the health of the electronic video
game industry." Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd,
669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
6. Federal courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over "any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976).
7. In 1976, the United States Congress passed a sweeping revision of the Copyright
Act of 1909. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)). All
video game copyright litigation falls under the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V
1981). Other forms of intellectual property protection for video games are outside the scope
of this Recent Development.
8. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 1 25,337, at
16,890 (N.D. IlM. June 2, 1981) (stating that the framers of the Copyright Act clearly did not
anticipate the specific problems advanced electronic games have raised).
9. Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is im-
possible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The bill does
not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at the present
stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas com-
pletely outside the present congressional intent.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5664 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
10. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
11. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
12. See infra notes 150-201 and accompanying text.
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substantially similar, namely the audience test and judicial modifi-
cations of the audience test.
Part III discusses recent video game copyright infringement
cases. Part III first surveys video game "knock-off" cases, in which
defendants produce and market video games that are virtually
identical to previously copyrighted video games. Part III then dis-
cusses copyright cases concerning video games that are not virtu-
ally identical, thereby requiring factfinders to determine whether
two games are substantially similar.
Part IV criticizes the substantial similarity analysis that
courts use in video game copyright infringement cases. Part IV as-
serts that these courts treat video games like standard board
games and focus primarily on visual videographic similarities be-
tween video games to determine whether they are substantially
similar. Part IV argues that factfinders should play the video
games that an infringement suit involves, and consider both visual
videographic similarities and similarities in the manner in which
the two games play in determining whether they are substantially
similar. Finally, Part IV discusses the benefits of applying its pro-
posed substantial similarity analysis to future video game copy-
right infringement cases in light of developing trends in the video
game industry.
II. LE:GAL BACKGROUND
A plaintiff successfully may bring a copyright infringement ac-
tion by proving that he owned a valid copyright covering a prior
work' s and that the defendant copied the plaintiff's copyrighted
work.1' Rarely does direct evidence of copying exist.15 Courts infer
copying, however, when a plaintiff proves that a defendant had ac-
cess16 to the plaintiff's work and developed a product that was sub-
stantially similar to it. 17 Parties rarely contest the access issue in
video game copyright infringement actions,1 8 and therefore, sub-
13. Normally the plaintiff can satisfy the ownership requirement by producing a cer-
tificate of registration from the Copyright Office. This certificate is "prima facie evidence of
the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate." 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1976). See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of challenges to the
validity of video game copyrights.
14. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 at 13-3 (1983 ed.).
15. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
16. "Access" is the opportunity to copy a work. Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 34
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17. See 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[A], at 13-5 to 13-6.
18. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
1983] 1279
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stantial similarity often is the key issue.
A. Limitations on Finding Substantial Similarity
Courts must undertake two types of analysis to ascertain
whether works are substantially similar. First, courts must define
the scope of a plaintiff's copyright to determine what a defendant
may or may not copy. Central to this determination is the idea-
expression principle, which states that copyright laws protect only
expressions of ideas, not the abstract ideas underlying a copy-
righted work.19 Second, courts must compare the defendant's work
with the plaintiff's protectible expression to decide whether they
are substantially similar.2 °
1. The Idea-Expression Principle
(a) Theoretical Approach: The Continuum Between Ideas
and Expressions
In 1789 the Constitution's framers granted Congress the power
to enact copyright laws.2 ' Since that time, Congress and the courts
have struggled to balance properly society's interest in encouraging
individual ingenuity in the arts and sciences with society's interest
in promoting national progress by allowing individuals to utilize
the fruits of another's creativity.22 To accommodate these conflict-
ing goals, the courts have developed the principle that a person
may copyright only the expression of an idea, and not the abstract
idea itself.2 3 Congress codified this principle in the 1976 Act.2 4 The
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982) (parties stipulated access); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (N.D. IM. 1982) ("ample evidence" of access shown);
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981) (wide dissemina-
tion of plaintiff's work indirectly demonstrated access); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,
543 F. Supp. 466, 482 (D. Neb. 1981) (court may not require proof of access when similarity
between works is striking).
19. See infra notes 21-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the idea-expres-
sion principle. Although courts and commentators often characterize the distinction be-
tween ideas and expressions as a dichotomy, this distinction more closely resembles a con-
tinuum. See infra id.
20. See infra notes 90-130 and accompanying text.
21. "The Congress shall have the power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings . . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 980 (1976).
23. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). The landmark case that established the
idea-expression principle was Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker plaintiff, who
previously had published a book describing an accounting system he had developed, tried to
1280 [Vol. 36:1277
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degree of copyright protection courts will give to the expression of
an idea traverses a continuum and depends upon the dist-
inguishability of the idea from its expression. At one end of this
continuum are expressions which arise from ideas that are capable
of expression in only one or a limited number of ways. These ideas
and expressions are virtually indistinguishable and courts will
grant the expression little, if any, copyright protection. 25 For exam-
ple, in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian26 the plain-
tiff brought suit claiming that the defendant infringed its copy-
right on a jeweled bee pin. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit was unable to differentiate between the idea of a
jeweled bee pin and its expression. 7 Consequently, the court held
that when an idea and its expression are inseparable, valid copy-
right registration would not bar copying the expression. Similarly
in Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.2 9 the court found that a per-
son could express the rules for a sales promotional contest in only
a limited number of ways. Thus, the court refused to allow the
party who had designed the contest rules to isolate them from the
public by copyrighting all possible expressions of the rules.30
prevent the defendant from selling a book containing book-keeping forms based on that
system. The Court held that although the plaintiffs book enjoyed copyright protection, the
ideas that his book produced and described through diagrams and illustrations did not de-
serve copyright protection. Id. at 104-05.
Professor Nimmer believes that the first amendment requires the copyright laws to pro-
tect only copyrighted expressions of ideas. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 1.10[B], at 1-
72; Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1178-82
(5th Cir. 1980) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting). But see Hopkins, Ideas, Their Time
Has Come: An Argument and a Proposal For Copyrighting Ideas, 46 ALB. L. RE v. 443
(1982).
24. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). The statute did not change existing copyright law. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5670
("[T]he basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.").
25. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967).
26. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
27. Id. at 742. The court also considered evidence produced at the district court evi-
dentiary hearing which demonstrated that the defendants had designed their jeweled bee
pins themselves after studying bees in nature and in published works. Id. at 739.
28. Id. But see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.
1970), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
defendant infringed the plaintiff's copyright on jeweled bee pins by using the plaintiff's rub-
ber bee pin molds to make its own bee pin.
29. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
30. Id. at 679 (The court stated that it could not "recognize copyright as a game of
chess in which the public can be checkmated.").
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Expressions whose complexity and artistry clearly distinguish
them from their ideas lie at the other end of the continuum,31 and
courts require a lesser degree of appropriation of such expressions
to find infringement.32 For example, in Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,33 the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed jury findings that the defendant, McDonald's Corporation,
had infringed the plaintiff's copyright on its "H.R. Pufnstuf" chil-
dren's show by producing "McDonaldland" television commer-
cials.3 4 Defendant admittedly copied the idea of plaintiff's Pufn-
stuf, a fantasyland filled with diverse and fanciful action
characters.3 5 Defendants argued, however, that the jury should not
have found copyright infringement because the characters, setting,
and plot in the two expressions of the fanciful idea were too dis-
similar.3 6 The court found that the expression inherent in the H.R.
Pufnstuf series differed markedly from its relatively simple idea.3 7
The court noted that each of the Pufnstuf characters had devel-
oped a unique personality and a particular method of interacting
with other characters and the environment.38 Thus, the court re-
lied upon the principle that the scope of copyright protection in-
creases to the extent expression differs from its idea," and af-
firmed the jury's finding that the defendant substantially
appropriated the plaintiff's Pufnstuf expression of the fantasyland
idea. 0
(b) Influential Factors in Judicial Analysis of Idea-Expression
Issues
No single factor dominates judicial analysis of idea-expression
issues in copyright infringement cases. Rather, as in "fair use"
cases, 41 courts consider a variety of factors when analyzing an idea-
31. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
33. 562 F.2d at 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
34. Id. at 1160.
35. Id. at 1165.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1169.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1168.
40. Id. at 1169.
41. The fair use section in the 1976 Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
1282 [Vol. 36:1277
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expression issue.4 2 Two prominent factors that courts consider are
the intent of the defendant who copies the work, and the conduct
of the defendant in appropriating the work.
First, although a plaintiff does not have to prove that a defen-
dant had the intent to bring a successful infringement claim,4 and
a plaintiff can recover even if a defendant only subconsciously ap-
propriates the plaintiff's copyrighted work," evidence of intent to
copy apparently has influenced some courts45 in their analysis of
infringement cases.46 For example, in Miller v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc.,'7 plaintiff brought an action alleging that the defendants
infringed the copyright on his book about an extraordinary kid-
napping by producing and broadcasting a television movie con-
cerning the incident. The plaintiff and the movie's producer had
negotiated the possibility of selling palintiff's rights to the pro-
ducer but failed to reach an agreement.48 During the jury trial
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
42. The factors that § 107 lists are not exclusive. According to § 101 of the 1976 Act,
"[t]he terms 'including' and 'such as' are illustrative and not limitative."
43. But see 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976) (criminal infringement). The issue of whether a
defendant intended to copy a plaintiff's work is a factor courts may weigh in awarding dam-
ages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976).
44. See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
45. See Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933) (recognizing in dicta
the utility of evidence of intent to copy); Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984
(S.D. Fla. 1978); Para-Tone, Inc. v. Pantone, Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393 (N.D. IlM. 1971).
46. For a detailed discussion of the significance of intent to copy, see Radin, The Sig-
nificance of Intent to Copy in a Civil Action for Copyright Infringement, 54 TEMPLE L.Q. 1,
10-18 (1981).
47. 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd and rem'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case because the district judge
improperly instructed the jury that an author's labor of research was copyrightable. Miller
v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d at 1370-72. Although the Fifth Circuit held that this
improper jury instruction was reversible error, the court stated there was sufficient evidence
of copying to support a finding of infringement and a verdict for the author under relevant
copyright laws. Id. at 1367.
48. Miller, 460 F. Supp. at 985-86.
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plaintiff introduced a memo in which the screenplay writer in-
formed the producer that he was using the plaintiff's book.4'9 The
jury verdict favored the plaintiff, and in its opinion considering de-
fendants' motion for new trial, the court apparently included in-
tent to copy among factors important to plaintiff's proof of defen-
dants' copying and liability for infringement.50 For example, the
court stated that the memo was "[p]articularly damning evidence
against defendants" and concluded that the memo alone was suffi-
cient to justify a finding of infringement.51
Second, when a defendant's method of appropriating a copy-
righted work offends a court, this conduct can influence the court's
infringement decision. For example, the defendant in Herbert Ro-
senthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt5 2 used the plaintiff's rubber
mold to duplicate a jeweled bee pin to which the plaintiff held a
copyright. The Second Circuit found that this behavior constituted
infringement.58  In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian,5 ' however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit did not find liability when the defendant merely
designed a similar piece of jewelry based upon independent re-
search of bees.5 The justification for these differing decisions lies
in the more offensive behavior of the Grossbardt defendant. Simi-
larly, the Ninth Circuit's sense of moral outrage over the defen-
dant's method of copying the plaintiff's work is the only apparent
explanation for the court's affirmation of the district court's judg-
ment for the plaintiff in Runge v. Lee.5" The plaintiff in Runge,
49. Id. at 986. The memo stated in pertinent part:
The newspaper stories from Miami and Atlanta and the trial transcript that Re-
search wrote for [sic] weeks ago would undoubtedly supply all the information I would
need, but to date none of it has arrived. Consequently all I have to go on-and have
been using while waiting-is the book, and that is verboten.
Id.
50. Radin, supra note 46, at 14.
51. Miller, 460 F. Supp. at 986. The Second Circuit, however, subsequently repudiated
the Miller holding that an author's research is copyrightable. Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980). Accord Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F.
Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C. 1980). See 1 M. NIMmER, supra note 14, § 2.11[E], at 2-164 to 2-168.
But see Case Comment, Will the Denial of Copyright to an Author's Research Impede
Scholarship?, Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 103 (1982). The
Fifth Circuit reversed Miller on appeal. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365
(5th Cir. 1981).
52. 436 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. Id.
54. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. Id. at 739.
56. 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971).
1284 [Vol. 36:1277
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who had published a book describing her facial exercise tech-
niques, hired the defendant and taught her the system.17 Subse-
quently, the defendant left the plaintiff's employment to open her
own salon and published a book describing the plaintiff's facial ex-
ercises.58 The Ninth Circuit held that this behavior infringed the
plaintiff's rights, but one commentator has argued forcefully that
the court's decision was erroneous.5 9
Because of the general nature of the idea-expression principle,
courts sometimes apply it improperly. The principle's generality,
however, provides courts with flexible guidelines for determining
the appropriate scope of copyright protection. Although commen-
tators frequently are critical,60 courts admit that no one has devel-
oped a better analytical method than the idea-expression principle
to reward works of original authorship without unduly restricting
others from utilizing the works."1
(c) Idea-Expression Principle Tests
Judicial application of the idea-expression principle is prob-
lematic. Obviously, a defendant infringes another author's copy-
righted expression by copying it exactly. If courts restricted copy-
right protection to exact copying, however, plagiarists could avoid
copyright violations by claiming authorship of an immaterially va-
ried version of another person's copyrighted works.62 Congress,
57. Id. at 580.
58. Id.
59. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[A] at 13-21 n.25. Professor Nimmer ar-
gues that although the plaintiff in Runge originated the exercises, the defendant did not
copy the plaintiff's written expression of the exercises. Moreover, he contends that the
plaintiff did not author the exercises, but merely discovered certain facts concerning the
effect of certain treatments on the human body. Professor Nimmer bases his arguments on
the principle that the "first person to espouse a given theory as to the significance of certain
facts cannot claim copyright in the theory any more than such person could claim copyright
in the facts per se." Id. at 13-22 n.25. (citing McMahon v. Prentice-Hall Inc., 486 F. Supp.
1296 (E.D. Mo. 1980)).
60. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 23; Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Ex-
pression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 124-31 (1980); Libbett,
Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World,
16 CoPvIaGHr L. SyMp. (ASCAP) 30 (1968).
61. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
62. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). See also Universal Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162
F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947) (stating that "an infringement is not confined to literal and
exact repetition or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the matter of
any work may be adupted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable
1983] 1285
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therefore, designed the copyright laws to encourage original works
of authorship, 3 and courts grant these works protection from non-
literal copying. The courts, however, limit this protection and at-
tempt to prevent authors from denying society the right to receive
any new works that contain the same general subject matter as an
original work by utilizing the idea-expression principle. Courts
have developed several tests that provide guidelines for application
of this principle.
(i) The Abstractions Test
The earliest and most famous idea-expression test is Judge
Learned Hand's "abstractions test."" Judge Hand's test resembles
a continuum model. At one end of the continuum is a mere ab-
stract idea that is capable of description in a single phrase or sen-
tence. As an idea moves along the continuum, however, it becomes
more detailed and requires a longer synopsis to describe it. At
some indefinite point along the continuum, the idea becomes suffi-
ciently specific and distinct to constitute a protectible "expres-
sion," even though it is not the author's literal expression of the
idea.
Commentators have criticized Judge Hand's test as constitut-
ing little more than a restatement of the principle that the copy-
right laws protect only expressions of ideas.15 Judge Hand later ad-
alterations to disguise the piracy.").
63. See supra text accompanying note 22. Although Congress did not establish origi-
nality as a statutory prerequisite for copyright protection until the 1976 Act, the courts
traditionally have required it. See Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 29, 31
(1983).
64. Judge Hand articulated the abstractions test as follows:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent
the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931).
65. [T]he abstractions test for substantial similarity is no test at all. Judge Hand's
decision clearly states the accepted rule of law ... that copyright protection extends
only to the expression of the idea and not the idea itself. The "abstraction" is merely
the idea/expression continuum. The test of drawing the line distinctly on that contin-
uum between areas within and outside the scope of copyright protection was not an-
nounced by Judge Hand.
Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 60, at 119 (emphasis in original). See also 3 M. NIMumm,
supra note 14, § 13.03[A], at 13-20.1 (Professor Nimmer argues that the "abstractions test is
1286
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mitted that no test could determine when an imitator had copied
the expression of an idea and not merely the underlying idea.6
Consequently, Judge Hand concluded that courts must make this
determination on an ad hoc basis.
67
(ii) The Patterns Test
Professor Chaffee's "patterns test" provides a slightly more
precise method than Judge Hand's abstraction test for determining
when the similarities between two works are substantial enough to
constitute infringement.6 8 Rather than inquiring whether the simi-
larities between two works are abstract, the patterns test compares
similarities between the sequence of events and the interplay of
characters in the works."' For example, Professor Nimmer used the
patterns test to compare the play Romeo and Juliet and the movie
West Side Story and found a pattern of thirteen significant events
common to both works.7 0 Based upon this analysis, he concluded
that the two works were substantially similar.7 1 Professor Nimmer
believes that the patterns test allows courts to avoid "the abdica-
tion of reasoned analysis" which is implicit in Judge Hand's con-
clusion that courts must apply the idea-expression principle on an
ad hoc basis. 2
The patterns test, however, is essentially a glorified version of
the abstractions test.7 3 In describing a work at different levels of
abstraction, courts inevitably must discuss the sequence of events
and the interplay of characters in the work. Furthermore, explicit
and exclusive comparison of only the sequence of events and the
interaction of characters in two works may not accurately reflect
the degree of their similarity. Less precise factors such as the tone
and mood of two works also are influential.7"
helpful in that it vividly describes the nature of the quest for 'the expression of an idea.' It
does not, of course, tell us where in any given work the level of abstraction is such as to
cross the line from expression to idea."); B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 48
(1967) ("Hand's explanation does, I think, sharpen our awareness of what we are about, but
surely the technique described lacks precision.").
66. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
67. Id.
68. See Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 513
(1945).
69. Id. at 514.
70. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[A], at 13-22.1 to 13-24.
71. Id. at 13-24. But cf. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 60, at 149.
72. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[A], at 13-22 to 13-22.1.
73. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 60, at 136.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
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Most courts use the abstractions and patterns tests to distin-
guish between ideas and expressions in copyright infringement
cases.7 5 In practice, however, judicial opinions seldom do more
than cite these tests.7 6 Courts rarely enumerate the common pat-
terns that two works share or pinpoint the similarities that precipi-
tated a finding of infringement.
2. The Scenes a Faire Doctrine
In addition to the idea-expression principle's limitations on
copyright protection, the scenes a faire doctrine also limits the
ability of an author to protect his work.7 7 Scenes a faire are inci-
dents, characters, or settings that, as a practical matter, are indis-
pensable, or at least standard, in treatments of a certain topic.
8
While courts usually apply the doctrine to incidents or sequences
of events, they occasionally apply it to "stock characters 7 9 or to
any other standard aspect of a topic. If scenes a faire constitute
the only similarity between two works, courts will find no actiona-
ble similarity because scenes a faire are not copyrightable. 0 Exam-
75. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[A], at 13-19 to 13-27.
76. But see id. at 13-22.1 to 13-24 (in which Professor Nimmer applies the patterns
test in making a detailed comparison of Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story).
77. The term scenes a faire originated in Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F.
Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
78. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Professor Nimmer has described scenes a faire as an expression that "necessarily re-
sults from the fact that the common idea is only capable of expression in more or less stere-
otyped form." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[A], at 13-29. Few ideas inherently are
capable of expression only in a stereotyped form. For example, a heroic figure with super
powers is expressible as either a stereotypical character that may receive no copyright pro-
tection or as a developed character that receives copyright protection. See Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 523 F. Supp. 611, 616-18 (S.D.N.Y.) (injunction denied),
afl'd, 654 F.2d 204, 208-11 (2d Cir. 1981), 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1193-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (sum-
mary judgment granted), in which the court held that the lead character in "The Greatest
American Hero" television show was not substantially similar to the Superman character.
The idea of standard features or stock characters more accurately illustrates the concept of
scenes a faire than does Professor Nimmer's definition.
79. See, e.g., Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (the
stock character in a Vietnam story was a man who was patriotic before going to war, but
whose war experiences confused his values).
80. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980)
(stating that "[b]ecause it is virtually impossible to write about a particular historical era or
fictional theme without employing certain 'stock' or standard literary devices, we have held
that scenes a faire are not copyrightable as a matter of law."); see also Davis v. United
Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). A better and more intellectually honest
view of the scenes a faire doctrine is that scenes a faire intertwine with a work's underlying




ples of scenes a faire in the movie "Roots," which portrayed the
plight of Negroes in slavery, were scenes that depicted attempted
slave escapes, happy and sorrowful singing of blacks, the atrocity
of buying and selling human beings, and sexual acts between male
slaveowners and females slaves."1
When a defendant copies a large number of scenes a faire
from another person's copyrighted work, however, the court may
find infringement.8 2 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ven-
tures International, Inc.,8 3 for example, the court held that the
film "Great White" infringed the film "Jaws" because of similari-
ties that retrospectively appear to be scenes a faire. The defen-
dants unsuccessfully argued that the similarities between the two
films consisted of unprotected general ideas and scenes a faire .
4
The court labelled the defendants' argument an "overly expansive
view" of the idea-expression principle.8 5 Many of the similarities
the court found, however, resembled scenes a faire. For example,
the shark in both films was "maniacal and demonic, attacking peo-
ple and boats for reasons beyond satisfying hunger."88 In both
movies, the shark attacked a dinghy, capsized it, and consumed the
occupant.8 7 These similarities appear to be standard features of
any movie about vicious shark attacks. The court's statement that
"[t]he similarity in the basic story lines, the major characters, the
sequences of events, and the interplay and development of the
characters and plot is substantial" ' seems correct, but the type of
similarities the court cited in finding infringement in Film Ven-
tures does not appear distinguishable from other elements of
works that courts have labelled scenes a faire.89 Thus, the Film
Ventures decision suggests that if a defendant borrows many
scenes a faire from another person's copyrighted work, a court
may find infringement.
81. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. at 45 & n.7.
82. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 1977); Malkin v. Dubinsky, 146 F. Supp. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
83. 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
84. Id. at 1141.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1137.
87. Id. at 1138.
88. Id. at 1141.
89. See supra notes 78-79 for examples of scenes a faire.
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B. Judicial Tests for Determining Substantial Similarity
1. The Audience Test
(a) Validity of the Audience Test
Although courts agree that determination of substantial simi-
larity is a question of fact, they disagree about the proper method
of analyzing this issue."e Most courts purport to apply the ordinary
observer or audience test."' The audience test basically asks
whether an average member of the audience of an allegedly in-
fringing work would view it as substantially similar to the prior
work.9 2 In Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witner9 3 the Ninth Circuit illus-
trated the audience test with the following example: "If an ordi-
nary person who has recently read [a] story sits through the pres-
entation of [a movie], if there had been literary piracy of the story,
he should detect that fact without any aid or suggestion or critical
analysis by others. The reaction of the public to the matter should
be spontaneous and immediate."94
Professor Nimmer has criticized the audience test, claiming
that an audience's impression of infringement sometimes does not
coincide with actual infringement.9 5 He fears that the audience test
allows defendants who unlawfully appropriate another's work to
escape liability because the audience fails to detect the similarities
between the two works.96 Furthermore, Professor Nimmer believes
that audiences are very susceptible to overlooking the similarities
between two works when a defendant conveys a version of the orig-
90. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[E][1], at 13-40.
91. Id. Most often courts speak of the ordinary observer test. This Recent Develop-
ment adopts the audience test terminology to emphasize the fact that when a work appeals
to a particular audience, its reaction is a more valid indicator of substantial similarity than
that of the ordinary observer. See Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role
for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385
(1981).
92. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[E][1], at 13-41 (citing Harold Lloyd Corp. v.
Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)).
93. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
94. Id. at 18.
95. Professor Nimmer argues that:
The Copyright Act is intended to protect writers from the theft of the fruits of their
labor, not to protect against the general public's "spontaneous and immediate" impres-
sion that the fruits have been stolen. To be sure the ordinary observer's impression
that there has been a theft is important evidence in establishing that in fact there was
a theft, but the two are not the same.





inal work in a different medium.9 7 He reasons that expression of an
author's work through a different medium often camouflages the
resemblances between the two works.9 8 For example, a novelist
often will include introspective thoughts and emotions within a
written story "which of necessity when dramatized will be ex-
pressed in a quite different manner.""
Professor Nimmer's criticism of the audience test seems unjus-
tified. Congress designed the Copyright Act to encourage authors
to make original contributions for the benefit of society. The Act
accomplishes this goal by giving authors a legally protected inter-
est in the potential rewards resulting from public approval of their
work.100 If the public perceives the two works as distinct, then the
public gains from having both works. Similarly, if ordinary mem-
bers of the public cannot recognize the similarity between an origi-
nal work and an allegedly infringing work, the allegedly infringing
work probably has not damaged the original work's value in the
marketplace. This reasoning led two commentators to analogize
Professor Nimmer's criticism of the audience test and his concern
about the possibility of undetected literary theft to the philosophi-
cal question whether a tree falling in the forest makes a sound. 01
They contend "that unless a theft is observable, the theft does not
matter" and probably never occurred. 02
97. Id. at 14-49.
98. Id. In Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., 175 F. 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1910), in which the
plaintiff claimed that a play infringed his short story, Professor Nimmer believes that the
court accurately described the problem of recognizing similarities between an original work
and an allegedly infringing version of that work expressed in a different medium:
It is, of course, true that the play has many additional incidents. It is likewise true that
none of the language of the story is used in the play and that the charters have differ-
ent names. But the right given to the author to dramatize his work includes the right to
adapt it for representation upon the stage which must necessarily involve changes, ad-
ditions and omissions. It is impossible to make a play out of a story to represent a
narrative by dialogue and action without making changes. . . . Few short stories
could be transformed into dramatic compositions without the addition of many new
incidents. (emphasis added).
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[E][2], at 13-44 to 45 (quoting Dam v. Kirke La Shelle
Co., 175 F. at 907).
99. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[E][2], at 13-44.
100. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that the "economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ").




(b) The "Total Concept and Feel" Standard
The courts have enhanced their support for the audience test
by adopting the principle that in applying the test to decide the
substantial similarity issue, the trier of fact should consider the
"total concept and feel" of the works which it compares. 0 3 The
total concept and feel standard depends on a trier of fact's overall
comparison of the two works, not upon an expert's impression of
selected parts. While comparison of certain portions of two works
is important, and also is the method of analysis under other copy-
right tests, 04 the substantial similarity analysis should focus pri-
marily on the similarities between two works taken as a whole.
In Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.10 5 the federal
district court judge overturned a jury finding of copyright infringe-
ment and illustrated the importance of properly applying the total
concept and feel standard to resolve substantial similarity issues.
The plaintiffs in Bevan alleged that the defendant's comical televi-
sion series "Hogan's Heroes" infringed their dramatic play "Stalag
17. ''116 The district judge overturned the jury's finding of copyright
infringement because he felt that the mood, the details and inter-
action between characters, and the "dynamic of events" in the two
works differed significantly.'0 7 He reasoned that while grim themes
of human desperation pervaded "Stalag 17," the "Hogan's Heroes"
series was comical in nature and dealt primarily with scenes of
"unabashed slapstick.'10 The Bevan decision does not mean that
a comedy can never infringe a drama, it merely suggests that triers
of fact, when comparing two works, should focus upon specific sim-
ilarities and differences and upon less specific factors such as over-
all mood and sequences of events.'09
103. The term "total concept and feel" originated in Roth Greeting Cards v. United
Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
104. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Hand's
abstractions test and Professor Chaffee's patterns test for distinguishing ideas from expres-
sions under the idea-expression principle.
105. 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
106. Id. at 602.
107. Id. at 605.
108. Id. at 605-06. See also Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 209 U.S.
P.Q. 200, 204 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that the total concept and feel of "Star Wars" and
"Battlestar Galactica" are vastly different because Star Wars resembles a morality play and
Battlestar Galactica is a space age cowboys and Indians story.).
109. Courts sometimes improperly apply the total concept and feel standard by merely
citing the total concept and feel language and then ignoring it. For example, in Eden Toys,
Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982), the United States Court of Ap-
peals purportedly used the total concept and feel standard but then improperly dissected
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2. Judicial Modifications of the Audience Test
Courts have developed two modifications of the audience test
to assist in determinations of whether works in copyright infringe-
ment cases are substantially similar. In Arnstein v. Porter,110 the
Second Circuit articulated the most famous refinement of the audi-
ence test. Under the Arnstein approach, courts use a two part test
to resolve substantial similarity issues. First, a trial judge must de-
termine whether the similarities between the original and the al-
legedly infringing works are substantial enough to prove copying.
1"
During this part of the Arnstein analysis, parties may dissect the
two works analytically to demonstrate their similarities and differ-
ences." ' Additionally, parties may introduce expert witnesses to
aid the trier of fact in determining whether copying occurred. 1 3 An
expert, for example, could delineate the similarities and differences
in sequences of events, plots, and characters in the two works." 4 If
the plaintiff proves copying under the first part of the Arnstein
test, he then must prove that the copying was sufficiently substan-
tial to constitute unlawful appropriation."35 Under this second part
the appearance of two toy snowmen, found a number of minor differences between the two
toys, and held that the toys were not substantially similar. Id. at 499-501. Circuit Judge
Lumbard, dissenting, charged the majority with misapplying the ordinary observer test, and
implicitly argued that the majority failed to apply the total concept and feel standard.
Judge Lumbard stated:
The toy buyers will not have the two side by side for comparison as we did. Nor will
they carry rulers to detect that the snowmen's nose widths, lip lengths, eye spaces and
button diameters differ by fractions of an inch. Nor will they pause for serious investi-
gation of the different stitching or contours. No; the average observer's glance will light
on one with the same favor as on the other. They share similar composition (two snow-
balls, two buttons, scarf, face and hat), they share similar facial expressions, and, in
general, they share the same "aesthetic appeal."
In sanctioning this misappropriation, the majority leaves open to future copyists the
chance to seize the essence of a work while escaping liability through minor changes.
Id. at 501-502 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
110. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
111. Id. at 468.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. For a general example of how parties compare two works, see Miller v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 502 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
115. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. If the plaintiff fails to prove unlawful appropriation
under the second part of the Arnstein analysis, the copying is permissible. Copying might
not equal unlawful appropriation for a variety of reasons. A court may find copying permis-
sible when the defendant copied only ideas, copying was de minimis, or the copying was
within the boundaries of fair use. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
artfully articulated this point by stating: "[wihile a '[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose,'
substantial similarity is not always substantial similarity." Universal Athletic Sales Co. v.
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of the Arnstein analysis the trier of fact must use the standard of
an "ordinary lay observer" operating without the assistance of ex-
pert testimony or a technical discussion of similarities and differ-
ences between the works to decide whether appropriation was
unlawful."
n
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
ald's Corp.,"7 the Ninth Circuit offered an alternate approach to
the Arnstein modification of the audience test. The Ninth Circuit
designed the Krofft "extrinsic-intrinsic" test to facilitate accurate
implementation of the idea-expression principle." 8 Under the "ex-
trinsic-intrinsic" test the trial judge first must decide whether the
ideas underlying two works are substantially similar."' This "ex-
trinsic" part of the Krofft test allows the court to permit the intro-
duction of expert testimony and the analysis of specific details of
the two works.1' 0 If the ideas are similar, the factfinder then de-
cides whether the expressions of the ideas are substantially simi-
lar. '' Under this "intrinsic" part of the Krofft test, the factfinder
operates pursuant to an "ordinary reasonable person" standard
and without the assistance of expert testimony or analytical dissec-
tion of the two works to determine whether the expressions in the
works are substantially similar.'2 2 Courts other than the Ninth Cir-
cuit generally have not adopted the Krofit approach. 2 '
Professor Nimmer feels that the principal difference between
the Arnstein and Krofft approaches is that the Krofft test dimin-
ishes a court's ability to hold for the defendant as a matter of
law.'2 4 Under Krofft a court has very limited ability to rule for the
defendant before trial because the ideas underlying the works in
most cases usually are similar in some respect or the plaintiff never
would have filed suit.'2 5 Trial courts in the Ninth Circuit reacted
Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v.
Pinchock, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
116. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
117. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
118. Id. at 1163 n.6. The Ninth Circuit stated that the Arnstein court might have
tried to accomplish the same result as the "extrinsic-intrinsic" test, but the fact that it may
not have does not subtract from the Ninth Circuit's analysis. Id. at 1165-66 n.7.




123. The only case outside the Ninth Circuit adopting the Kroflt approach is MGM,
Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979).




to this problem by using the scenes a faire doctrine126 and a
stricter standard for finding similarity of ideas while applying the
first step of the Krofft approach.1 27 Professor Nimmer also argues
that the Krofft test limits the ability of appellate courts to reverse
jury verdicts that find substantial similarity because appellate
courts are reluctant to reverse a factfinder's subjective determina-
tion under the intrinsic portion of the Krofft test.
1 28
The ordinary observer test, which requires juries to determine
substantial similarity without the assistance of analytic dissection
of two works or expert testimony, seems to be the best test of sub-
stantial similarity in copyright infringement cases. Although juries
are fallible, the determination of substantial similarity is no more
difficult than many other determinations that our legal system en-
trusts to them. The "battle of the experts" that Professor Nimmer
seems to favor would shed little light on the key issue in copyright
infringement actions: whether the public believes the two works
are substantially similar. Instead, expert witnesses could easily
mislead juries by focusing their attention on minor differences or
similarities between two works that have little bearing on the in-
fringement issue.' ' 9 Even less helpful than opinions of expert wit-
nesses in these cases are the opinions of plaintiff-authors because
they often have an obsessive belief "that all similarities between
their works and any others which appear later must inevitably be
ascribed to plagiarism."130
126. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
127. Note, Copyright Infringement: An Argument for the Elimination of the Scenes a
Faire Doctrine, 5 CoM. ENT. L.J. 147, 168 (1982).
128. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.03[E][3], at 13-50. In Krofft the Ninth
Circuit stated that although appellate courts subject a fact finder's conclusion to the
"clearly erroneous" standard, an appellate court is "less likely to find clear error when the
subjective test for copying of expression has been applied." The intrinsic test is "uniquely
suited for determination by the trier of fact," so the court "must be reluctant to reverse it."
562 F.2d at 1166.
129. The testimony of an expert upon such issues, especially his cross-examination,
greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing .... It ought not to be allowed at all;
and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers the case and tends to
confusion, for the more the court is led into the intricacies of dramatic craftmanship,
the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered
impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class of cases such evidence
may in the future be entirely excluded. ...
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931).
130. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 613 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 790 (1946).
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Video game copyright infringement cases fall neatly into two
categories. The first category contains cases, commonly referred to
as "knock-offs," in which defendants produce games that are virtu-
ally identical to previously created games and then challenge the
validity of the copyrights on those games. Courts, however, have
granted copyright protection under the 1976 Act to the previously
created games and have held that the defendants' nearly identical
games have infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights.131 The second cate-
gory consists of cases in which courts have faced the more difficult
question of determining whether two video games are substantially
similar.13 2 The inconsistent analysis and results in these cases
demonstrate the continuing problem courts will face in future
video game litigation.
A. The "Knock-Off" Cases
Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act 33 protects video games as "au-
diovisual works. 13 4 Video game manufacturers consciously have
chosen to register the sounds and visual images of video games as
audiovisual works rather than registering the underlying computer
programs as literary works.135 This strategy protects manufacturers
131. See infra text accompanying notes 133-49.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 150-201.
133. The 1976 Act provides in pertinent part
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works ....
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) defines audiovisual works as follows:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are
embodied.
135. See Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The courts have upheld the
registration of video games as audiovisual works despite arguments of defendants that the
only protectible feature of a video game is its underlying computer program. See, e.g., Stern
Elec., Inc., 669 F.2d at 855; Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D.
Md. 1981); see also Jones, Video Games Litigation and the 1976 Copyright Act: The Ideas
of Games, the Expression of Aliens, and the Underlying Computer Software, 1 J. Copy-
RIGHT, ENT., & SPORTS L. 17, 44-48 (1982) (suggesting that uncertainty about the ability to
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from knock-off video games that use different computer programs
to produce games which are virtually identical to previously cre-
ated games. e13 As video game manufacturers have brought infringe-
ment actions against makers of knock-offs, imaginative litigators
have attempted to challenge the validity of video game copyrights
on at least two grounds.
First, defendants have argued that video games are not proper
subjects for copyright protection because they fail to meet the re-
quirements of section 102(a) of the 1976 Act. 3 7 Defendants have
claimed that video games are not "fixed" within the meaning of
the statute. " Courts have held, however, that because computer
circuits embody the audiovisual features of video games, and game
machines are capable of reproducing these audiovisual features,
they meet the 1976 Act's fixation requirement.' 39 Similarly, defen-
dants have argued that a player's participation in a video game
withdraws the audiovisual work from copyright eligiblity because
the game has no "fixed performance and the player becomes a co-
author of what appears on the screen."1 40 Courts have rejected this
argument, reasoning that although players participate in a video
game's audiovisual presentation, the presentation always contains
a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the game's sights
and sounds, and many aspects of the game's display do not vary
from game to game regardless of how the player operates the
game's controls.'4
protect computer programs was an additional reason for registering video games as audiovi-
sual works). The 1980 amendments to the 1976 Act resolved this uncertainty. Act of Dec. 12,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 1 10, 94 Stat. 3028.
136. See Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 855.
137. See supra note 133.
138. Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines the term "fixed" as follows:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both,
that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work
is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
139. See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1982);
Stem Elec., Inc., v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 855-56; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547
F. Supp. 999, 1007-08 (N.D. 111. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466,
480 (D. Neb. 1981).
140. See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern
Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 856-57 (2d Cir. 1982).
141. Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d at 874; see Stem Elec., Inc. v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 855-56.
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Second, defendants have argued that video games do not meet
the statutory formalities of depositing the work with the Copyright
Office 142 and displaying notice of copyright on the work.143 Video
game manufacturers have attempted to satisfy the deposit require-
ment by submitting a videotape of the audiovisual work to the
copyright office. The courts have held that although the parties did
not deposit actual copies of the video games with the office, the
videotapes satisfied the deposit requirement as "identifying mate-
rial" under Copyright Office regulations.1 " In addition, one court
has held that the videotape is as much a "copy" of the audiovisual
work as is the game itself, and therefore, depositing the videotape
already had met the 1976 Act's deposit requirement without refer-
ence to copyright office regulations.1 45 Another court, with refer-
ence to Copyright Office regulations, held that video game manu-
facturers satisfied the 1976 Act's copyright notice requirement by
including the notice within the visual display of the work or by
affixing the notice to the video game's terminal.
1 4
1
Subsequent to judicial decisions that video games are copy-
rightable, courts uniformly have found copyright infringement in
knock-off cases. Knock-off video games, by definition, are virtually
identical to the copyrighted video game.14' Even the names of the
142. Section 408 of Title 17 makes deposit a prerequisite for copyright registration. 17
U.S.C. § 408 (1976).
143. Section 401 of Title 17 requires notice of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
144. See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (37
C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(ix) (1981) specifically provides that deposit of identifying material at
the Copyright Office complies with the regulation); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981) (37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d) allows the Register of Copyrights
to grant special relief and permit deposit of alternative identifying material). The require-
ments for identifying material are listed in 37 C.F.R. § 202.21.
145. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
146. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(g) (adopted Dec. 1, 1981). See also Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 481-82 (D. Neb. 1981) (characterizing the proposed regula-
tions as a persuasive interpretation of section 401(c) of the 1976 Act).
147. A judge recently compared two video games in a knock-off case and described
their similarity as follows:
I have seen the machines, both of them, the accused device and the plaintiff's device in
operation, and I spent considerable time because of the fact that I happened to be
emergency Judge.
I may say, if I may make a little homely example, if I were a biologist and the machines
were animals,. . . I would have to find that both of these machines were ... at least
members of the same type or species.
I think I would have to go further... and find that they belonged to the same
family.
I would even have to go further but not as far as counsel for the plaintiff
says-they are not identical twins. In fact, they are not twins at all, but, in my judg-
1298
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infringing and original video games often are similar.4 s Thus, de-
fendants probably will not devise a successful strategy for defend-
ing the knock-off cases in the future. 4 '
B. Substantial Similarity and the Atari Trilogy
The determination of illegal copying is much more difficult in
copyright infringement suits in which video games are not virtually
identical than it is in knock-off cases. Three infringement cases, all
brought by Atari, Inc., have presented courts with the problem of
determining whether video games are substantially similar. 5 '
These cases reveal conflicting views concerning the protectible ele-
ments of video games and the correct method of analyzing sub-
stantial similarity in video game infringement actions.
1. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.
In Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.151 Atari sought to en-
join an alleged infringement of its video game "Asteroids" by
Amusement World, Inc.'s game entitled "Meteors.' 1 52 The federal
ment, they are brothers.
Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 25,320, at 16,844-45 (N.D. Il.).
See also Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir. 1982) (the games
were "virtually identical"); Stem Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982)
("virtually identical in both sight and sound"); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Bay Coin Dis-
tributors, Inc., 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 25,409, at 17,377 (E.D.N.Y.) (the "differences
among and between the games demonstrated were miniscule at best."); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Artie Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Other than ... trivial differences,
the Artic game is absolutely identical to Midway's Pac-Man"); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 483 (D. Neb. 1981) ("It cannot be overemphasized that, in
virtually every detail, the defendants' games are identical to the plaintiff's.").
148. See, e.g. Williams Elec., Inc. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1982)
("Defender" and "Defense Command"); Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("Scramble" and "Scramble"); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Bay Coin Distribu-
tors, Inc., 1982 Copyright L. Dec., 25,409, at 17,376 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1982) ("Donkey
Kong" and "Crazy Cong," "Crazy Kong"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Pac-Man" and "Puckman"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,
543 F. Supp. 466, 482-83 (D. Neb. 1981) ("Pac-Man" and "Mighty Mouth," "Galaxian" and
"Galactic Invaders," "Rally-X" and "Rally-X").
149. For a fuller discussion of issues relating to the validity of video game copyrights,
see Jones, supra note 135, at 27-35. See also Kramsky, The Video Game: Our Legal System
Grapples With a Social Phenomenon, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 335, 341-46 (1982).
150. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Atari, Inc.
v. Williams, 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 1 25,412, at 17,383 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1981); Atari,
Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 1 25,363, at
17,044 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176
(1982).
151. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
152. Injunctions are the standard remedy that plaintiffs seek in infringement cases
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district court judge examined the two games and found twenty-two
similarities and nine differences.15 After holding that Atari owned
because the "popularity of audiovisual games is notoriously short-lived." Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 484 (D. Neb. 1981). See also Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176
(1982) (suggesting the need for preliminary injunctions because of the short-lived nature of
video games).
153. The court found that the following design features in "Asteroids" and "Meteors"
were either similar or identical in both games:
(1) There are three sizes of rocks.
(2) The rocks appear in waves, each wave being composed initially of larger rocks.
(3) Larger rocks move more slowly than smaller ones.
(4) When hit, a large rock splits into two medium rocks, a medium rock splits into two
smaller ones, and a small rock disappears.
(5) When a rock hits the player's spaceship, the ship is destroyed.
(6) There are two sizes of enemy spaceships.
(7) The larger enemy spaceship is an easier target than the smaller one.
(8) The player's ship and enemy ships shoot projectiles.
(9) When a spaceship's projectiles hit a rock or another ship, the latter is destroyed
immediately.
(10) The destruction of any rock or spaceship is accompanied by a symbol of an
explosion.
(11) When an enemy spaceship is on the screen, the player hears a beeping tone.
(12) There is a two-tone beeping noise in the background throughout the game, and the
tempo of this noise increases as the game progresses.
(13) The player gets several spaceships for his quarter. The number of ships remaining
is displayed with the player's score.
(14) The score is displayed in the upper left corner for one player and the upper right
and left corners for two players.
(15) The control panels are painted in red, white, and blue.
(16) Four control buttons from left to right, rotate the player's spaceship counter-
clockwise, rotate it clockwise, move it forward, and fire the weapon.
(17) When a player presses the "thrust" button, his spaceship moves forward and when
he releases the button the ship begins to slow down gradually (although it stops more
quickly in "Meteors");
(18) The player gets an extra spaceship if he scores 10,000 points.
(19) Points are awarded on an increasing scale for shooting (a) large rock, (b) medium
rock, (c) small rock, (d) large alien craft, (e) small alien craft.
(20) When all rocks are destroyed a new wave of large rocks appears.
(21) Each new wave of rocks has progressively more large rocks than the previous
waves to increase the challenge of the game.
(22) A general overhead view of the battle field is presented.
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 224-25. The court also found several
differences between the two games:
(1) "Meteors" is in color, while "Asteroids" is in black and white.
(2) The symbols for rocks and spaceships in "Meteors" are shaded to appear three.
dimensional, unlike the flat, schematic figures in "Asteroids."
(3) The rocks in "Meteors" appear to tumble as they move across the screen.
(4) "Meteors" has a background that looks like distant stars.
(5) At the beginning of "Meteors," the player's spaceship is shown blasting off the
earth, whereas "Asteroids" begins with the player's spaceship in outer space.
(6) The player's spaceship in "Meteors" rotates faster.
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a valid copyright that covered its Asteroids game,15' the court con-
sidered the idea-expression issue.155 The court stated that, unlike
the jeweled bee pin idea in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian,5 a the idea of a video game in which a player shoots
space rocks was sufficiently general to permit more than one form
of expression that was distinguishable from the underlying idea.157
Thus, the court held that Atari's video game was copyrightable. 58
In determining the scope of the plaintiff's copyright, however,
the court held that most similarities between the two games were
"inevitable."159 The court stated that similarities which are inextri-
cably associated with the idea of a video game are not protectible
because protecting them would give the plaintiff a monopoly over
the idea.1 60 After discounting the unavoidable similarities between
the games and applying the "ordinary observer" test, the court
found that an ordinary player who compared Asteroids and Mete-
(7) The player's spaceship in "Meteors" fires faster and can fire continuously, unlike
the player's spaceship in "Asteroids," which can fire only bursts of projectiles.
(8) The pace of the "Meteors" game is faster at all stages.
(9) In "Meteors," after the player's spaceship is destroyed, when the new spaceship
appears on the screen, the game resumes at the same pace as immediately before the
last ship was destroyed; in "Asteroids" the game resumes at a slower pace.
Id. at 225.
154. Amusement World claimed that only the computer program was copyrightable,
and that the plaintiffs had not complied with the deposit requirement. Id. at 226-27. See
supra text accompanying notes 133-35 & 144-45.
155. See supra notes 21-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the idea-expres-
sion principle.
156. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
157. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 227, 229.
158. Id. at 226.
159. In discussing the inevitable similarities between the two video games with the
same underlying ideas, the district judge stated that-
There are certain forms of expression that one must necessarily use in designing a
video game in which a player fights his way through space rocks and enemy spaceships.
The player must be able to rotate and move his craft. All the spaceships must be able
to fire weapons which can destroy targets. The game must be easy at first and gradually
get harder, so that bad players are not frustrated and good ones are challenged. There-
fore, the rocks must move faster as the game progresses. In order for the game to look
at all realistic, there must be more than one size of rock. Rocks cannot split into very
many pieces, or else the screen would quickly become filled with rocks and the player
would lose too quickly. All video games have characteristic sounds and symbols
designed to increase the sensation of action. The player must be awarded points for
destroying objects, based on the degree of difficulty involved.
All these requirements of a video game in which the player combats space rocks
and spaceships combine to dictate certain forms of expression that must appear in any




ors would conclude that the games were different.16' Although the
court candidly admitted that Amusement World copied Atari's
idea, it held that the two expressions of the idea were not substan-
tially similar.' The court reasoned that the overall feel of the way
the two games played was different. It emphasized that the graph-
ics in Meteors were more realistic, the spaceship in Meteors han-
dled and fired differently, and the Meteors game generally was
faster paced and more difficult than Asteroids.""
2. Atari, Inc. v. Williams
In Atari, Inc. v. Williams,' 4 Atari attempted to enjoin the de-
fendant from marketing its home video game entitled "Jaw-
breaker," claiming that it infringed their "Pac-Man" game. At the
time the defendant sought to market Jawbreaker, Atari had not
yet perfected a home video version of Pac-Man.6 5 The court found
that although both video games used the same idea,' e6 a similarity
in ideas was not actionable. Specifically the court stated that the
copyright laws did not protect the idea of "a player symbol being
guided through a maze appearing to gobble up dots in its path
while being chased through the maze by several opponents."6 7 The
court also characterized Pac-Man's rules, strategy, and progress of
play as unprotectible ideas. 6 8 The court's opinion listed several
161. Id. at 229.
162. Id. at 230. The plaintiff sought to appeal the Amusement World decision, but the
parties subsequently settled during the summer of 1982. Telephone interview with Daniel
W. Vittum, Jr., lead counsel for the plaintiff (Nov. 18, 1982); Letter from David B. Hodges,
counsel for the plaintiff (Nov. 1982).
163. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 230.
164. 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 25,412, at 17,383 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1981).
165. Id. at 17,384.
166. The court stated that*
The idea of both "Jawbreaker" and "Pac-Man" is basically a maze with a number of
small objects (dots or circles) aligned within a maze. An object, appearing to be a
mouth, referred to herein as an eater, is guided through the maze by a player and
appears to eat the small object. Within the maze, a plurality of chasers chase the eater
through the maze. If the chaser catches the eater before he can eat all of the small
objects, the player's score is reduced. However, if the eater can devour all of the small
objects in the maze before the chaser catches him, then the player's score is increased.
If, at one point, the chaser catches the player, a replay begins. In the maze, at certain
spots, a larger (power) object appears in the maze. If this larger object is eaten by the
eater, it can turn and chase the chasers for a specified time, scoring points as they are
devoured.
Id. at 17,384-85 (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 17,386.
168. Id.
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similarities and differences between the games619 but concluded
that the "symbols and graphics" were sufficiently different that an
ordinary observer would not notice the games' similarity.170 The
court also concluded that the balance of equities in the case fa-
vored the defendant because he was marketing his home computer
game before Atari had perfected or marketed its home version of
Pac-Man. 17  Therefore, the court denied Atari's request for an in-
junction because it felt that the sale of Jawbreakers would not
cause Atari irreparable harm in the video game marketplace.
1 7 2
169. The court articulated the following similarities and differences between "Jaw-
breaker" and "Pac-Man":
a. In Plaintiff's game of "Pac-Man", the chasers are in the shape of ghosts which
have small legs extending downward and they seem to run along in the maze and travel
in the maze in a set pattern in the maze.
In Defendant's game of "Jawbreaker", the chasers are in the form of happy faces
which seem to roll along in the maze and travel in a random pattern in the maze while
keying in on the object it is chasing.
b. In Plaintiff's game of "Pac-Man", the object which is chased by the chaser is a
round-shaped object which has a pie-shaped opening which opens and shuts when it
devours dots aligned in the maze.
In Defendant's game of "Jawbreaker", the object which is chased by the chaser is a
set of teeth, simulating false teeth, which chomp up and down on small circles aligned
in the maze.
c. The colors of the chasers and eaters used in "Pac-Man" are different from those
used in the "Jawbreaker" game.
d. The music played is different in both games and "Pac-Man" has an attract
mode which plays prior to each game, and "Jawbreaker" has no attract mode.
e. In Plaintiffs game of "Pac-Man", the eyes of the ghost look in the direction in
which they are travelling.
In Defendant's game of "Jawbreaker", the smiling faces appear to be rolling and
will go in any direction, notwithstanding the direction they are facing.
fL In "Pac-Man", the items used to mark scores are cherries, oranges, strawberries,
and grapes, while in "Jawbreaker" the items used to score are candycanes, sailboats,
and gumdrops.
g. In Plaintiffs game of "Pac-Man" the energizer dots in the maze glow at a con-
stant color, while in the Defendant's game of "Jawbreaker", the energizer dots in the
maze are a plurality of rotating different colored smaller dots.
h. The maze in each game is not the same.
i. In plaintiffs game of "Pac-Man", when the ghosts catch the eater, it appears to
melt.
In the defendant's game of "Jawbreaker", when the smiling faces appear to catch
the false teeth, the teeth fall out to the bottom of the maze.
Id. at 17,385. The court also found that "Jawbreaker" had many unique features. For exam-
ple, the court stated that in "Jawbreaker", unlike "Pac-Man", if a player manipulates his
eater in such a manner that it devours all the game's dots before a chaser catches it, then a
toothbrush appears on the screen and brushes the eater's teeth. In addition, the court ob-
served that each chaser rotates in a different direction and has different faces. Id.
170. Id. at 17,386.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 17,385-86.
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3. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics
Corp.
In Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electron-
ics Corp.,1 8 Atari alleged that North American, by producing and
marketing its video game entitled "K. C. Munchkin," infringed
Atari's copyright on Pac-Man and sought injunctive relief in fed-
eral district court.17 ' The court found that the central character in
K. C. Munchkin, unlike the main character in Pac-Man, had a spe-
cific personality, and that the ghost monsters in K. C. Munchkin
were spookier than those in Pac-Man. 75 The court also found sev-
eral differences in the way the two games played. First, the Pac-
Man ghosts entered the game by moving upward from a stationary
central box while the box in K. C. Munchkin rotated ninety de-
grees every few seconds.176 Second, the Pac-Man maze contained
over 200 uniformly spaced stationary dots for the central character
to gobble, while the K. C. Munchkin maze contained only twelve
randomly spaced square dots that travelled throughout the
maze.17 7 Third, K. C. Munchkin required players to out-think the
moving dots and ghosts while Pac-Man allowed players to use a set
pattern of movement.17 8 Fourth, K. C. Munchkin displayed many
different mazes but Pac-Man displayed only one fixed maze.
17 9
Last, the sounds accompanying the two games were different.180
Based upon these findings, the district court denied Atari's request
for injunctive relief.'8 '
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that North
American infringed Atari's copyright on the Pac-Man game. 82 Af-
ter describing the two games in detail, 83 the court then discussed
the developmental history of the K. C. Munchkin game, which
showed that North American game designers and executives
played Pac-Man, discussed its increasing popularity, and then cre-
ated K. C. Munchkin in an attempt to develop a modified version
173. 1981-1983 Copyright L. Dec., 25,363, at 17,044 (N.D. Inl. Dec. 4, 1981).
174. Id. at 17,044.






181. Id. at 17,050.
182. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
183. Id. at 610-13.
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of Pac-Man. 1" North American, after examining the first version
of K. C. Munchkin, concluded that it was totally different from
Pac-Man but instructed its game designer to make changes in the
game to prevent consumers from confusing it with the Atari
model.185 North American issued internal instructions to refrain
from references to Pac-Man in promoting K. C. Munchkin.186 Nev-
ertheless, retailers and sales clerks described K. C. Munchkin as a
Pac-Man type game in advertisements and sales promotions.187
The Seventh Circuit, with references to the idea-expression princi-
ple1"8 and the scenes a faire doctrine,18 9 stated that the central
theme and rules of the Pac-Man game were unprotectible ideas.1 90
In addition, the court implicitly applied the scenes a faire doctrine
and said that certain standard video game features such as a maze
design, a scoring table, and edible dots, deserved protection only
from virtually identical copying, which the court felt did not occur
in this case.191 The court held, however, that North American's K.
C. Munchkin game substantially appropriated the fanciful and ar-
tistic characters of Pac-Man and portrayed them in a substantially
similar manner.
192
184. Id. at 613.
185. Id. at 613. K. C. Munchkin's game designer, an independent contractor of North
American, changed the color of the game's gobbler from yellow to blue. In addition, North




188. See supra notes 21-76 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
190. The court described the Pac Man video game as follows:
PAC-MAN is a maze-chase game in which the player scores points by guiding a central
figure through various passageways of a maze and at the same time avoiding collision
with certain opponents or pursuit figures which move independently about the maze.
Under certain conditions, the central figure may temporarily become empowered to
chase and overtake the opponents, thereby scoring bonus points. The audio component
and the concrete details of the visual presentation constitute the copyrightable expres-
sion of that game "idea."
Id. at 617.
191. Id.
192. The court compared the features of K. C. Munchkin and Pac-Man as follows:
The K. C. Munchkin gobbler has several blatantly similar features, including the rela-
tive size and shape of the "body," V-shaped "mouth," its distinctive gobbling action
(with appropriate sounds), and especially the way in which it disappears upon being
captured. An examination of the K. C. Munchkin ghost monsters reveals even more
significant visual similarities. In size, shape, and manner of movement they are virtu-
ally identical to their PAC-MAN counterparts. K. C. Munchkin's monsters, for exam-
ple, exhibit the same peculiar "eye" and "leg" movement. Both games, moreover, ex-
press the role reversal and "regeneration" process with such great similarity that an.
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The Seventh Circuit then dismissed each of North American's
arguments. First, the court found that the "laundry list of specific
differences" that persuaded the district court were not numerous
enough to override the obvious similarities.193 The Seventh Circuit
felt that the district court's focus on the minute differences instead
of the more obvious similarities between K. C. Munchkin and Pac-
Man caused it to lose sight of the forest for the trees.9 Second,
the court noted that video games appeal to a relatively undis-
criminating audience, and a player entranced by a game's play
would overlook minor differences in detail."95 Third, the court re-
jected the argument of North American and the district court by
stating that the focus of an infringement action is on the similari-
ties between protectible expressions, not between the way two
games play.196 Although the court realized that differences between
two games might alter their visual impressions, it felt that these
differences could not excuse the taking of a substantial part of the
plaintiff's work-the characters. 97 Finally, the court observed that
the history and promotion of the K. C. Munchkin game provided
additional evidence of the similarity between the games and the
intent of North American to disguise its intentional appropriation
of Atari's game. 98
The Seventh Circuit, based on its "ocular comparison" of the
two works, concluded that Atari probably would succeed in a copy-
right infringement suit against North American because K. C.
Munchkin captured the total concept and feel of Pac-man.1 99
Based upon the likelihood of Atari's success in an infringement
suit, combined with the evidence of irreparable harm that Atari





195. The court discussed the typical video game player's ability to discern subtle dif-
ferences between similar video games as follows:
Video games ... appeal to an audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their
concern about more subtle differences in artistic expression. The main attraction of a
game such as PAC-MAN lies in the stimulation provided by the intensity of the com-
petition. A person who is entranced by the play of the game "would be disposed to






199. Id. at 619-20.
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demonstrated, 00 the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
holding and directed the district court to grant Atari's request for
an injunction.101
IV. ANALYsis
A. Conflicting Models: Game Boards Versus Movies
Determining whether two video games are substantially simi-
lar poses a difficult copyright problem because video games are a
new and unique form of copyrightable expression. Since many
video games present only one unchanging background, some courts
logically might treat video games as standard board games and
compare only their static artistic features in resolving substantial
similarity questions. Courts, however, should not compare video
games by using a game board model. The Copyright Act protects
game boards as "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works,"2 ' but
video games qualify for copyright protection under the category of
"motion pictures and other audiovisual works."203 Additionally,
game boards are static designs, but video games present moving
characters, sequences of events, and other features that are more
characteristic of movies than board games.2 " In fact, some video
game designers foresee using motion pictures, instead of computer
graphics, as the visual background of video games in the future. 05
Although video games contain expressions that are simpler and
more closely related to their ideas than movies, video games should
receive the same protection from nonliteral copying as movies,
plays, books, and other story-type works. If courts analyze video
games as they do movies to determine substantial similarity, then
they could grant video game plaintiffs protection against defen-
dants who disguise copied video game expressions with cosmetic
differences. A movie model analysis also would allow courts to
200. Courts normally presume irreparable injury when a plaintiff proves copyright in-
fringement. Id. (citing Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978)). Even without aid of this presumption,
however, Atari demonstrated irreparable harm by producing evidence that it had invested
$1.5 million in developing, licensing, and promoting its home version of Pac-Man and that
North American would jeopardize this investment by marketing K. C. Munchkin. Atari, Inc.
v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d at 620.
201. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d at 620-21.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1976).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1976).
204. See, e.g., Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
afl'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) ("In essence, the work is a movie in which the viewer
participates in the action as the fearless pilot controlling the spaceship.").
205. Nulty, Why the Craze Won't Quit, FoRTuNE, Nov. 15, 1982, at 124.
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more accurately analyze two video games by comparing the total
concept and feel of the works and, as a result, adopt the substan-
tial similarity analysis to future developments in video game
technology.
B. The Scope of Protection
The starting point to determine the scope of protection that a
video game deserves is to distinguish between the game's unpro-
tectible ideas and the protectible expressions of those ideas. The
courts in Atari v. Williams and North American Philips reached
vastly different conclusions concerning the scope of Pac-Man's un-
protectible ideas.0 6 This discrepancy is explainable in several
ways. First, courts subjectively determine the scope of a work's
idea and this determination inevitably varies from case to case.
Second, underlying equitable factors seemed to influence the
judges in both cases. For example, in Atari v. Williams the court
felt that the equities favored the defendant because Atari had not
produced or marketed a home version of Pac-Man before the de-
fendant, a small audiovisual company in the video game market,
began marketing its game.207 In North American Philips, however,
the court seemed bothered by the defendant's obvious intent to
produce a game resembling Pac-Man.20 8 Last, the shortage of
meaningful precedent that distinguishes video game ideas and ex-
pressions gives courts broad discretion in making this
determination.
The Seventh Circuit's North American Philips opinion is
laudable because it clearly outlined the degrees of protection it
would afford various aspects of video games. The court stated that
it would protect certain expressions of a video game's underlying
idea because of their distinct "shapes, sizes, colors, sequences, ar-
rangements, and sounds."20 9 The court added that it would give
greater copyright protection to more complex and fanciful video
game expressions than simpler, less fanciful expressions.210 In
North American Philips, the court felt that the Pac-Man charac-
ters satisfied the complexity requirement for strong protection
against the infringing characters of K. C. Munchkin.21 ' The court
206. See supra notes 166 & 190 and accompanying text.
207. See supra text accompanying note 171.
208. See supra text accompanying note 197.
209. 272 F.2d at 617.
210. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1168-69 (9th Cir. 1977).
211. 672 F.2d at 617-18.
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stressed, however, that under the scenes a faire doctrine certain
standard video game features should receive protection only from
virtually identical copying.21 - The court characterized the maze de-
sign, tunnel exits, scoring table, and dots of Pac-Man as scenes a
faire.2 1s Finally, the court categorized Pac-Man's rules and idea as
not protectible.214 The Seventh Circuit's discussion of the scope of
copyright protection for various video game features in North
American Philips provides both judges and future potential liti-
gants with helpful guidance concerning future video game infringe-
ment suits.
The district court's reasoning in Atari v. Williams concerning
the scope of copyright protection that video games deserve was far
less helpful than the Seventh Circuit's discussion in North Ameri-
can Philips. Although the court described the basic idea underly-
ing Pac-Man, 15 it provided no explanation concerning how courts
should determine whether one video game infringed another. The
court merely stated that any similarities between K. C. Munchkin
and Pac-Man were "functional" without analyzing or discussing
them.218 The court's terse reasoning suggests that it used a stan-
dard game board analysis217 to determine whether the defendant's
Jawbreaker game was substantially similar to Pac-Man. As in stan-
dard game board cases, the court suggested that it would find sub-
stantial similarity between video games only if the two games pos-
sessed literal graphic similarities.21 8 The court never considered the
possibility of finding infringement for only nonliteral similarity be-
tween the two games. The district court erred in this respect.
Video games, like movies and books, should receive protection
from nonliteral copying to prevent video game infringers from es-
caping liability by masking their appropriations with cosmetic
videographical differences. 2 9 To deny video game designers protec-
tion from nonliteral similarity would be analogous to finding that a
new movie which copied the plot of a previously created and copy-
righted movie did not infringe the original movie because the char-
acters in the new movie wore different costumes.
212. Id. at 617.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 166.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
217. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 169 for a discussion of the specific graphic differences between
Jawbreaker and Pac-Man that concerned the court.
219. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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C. Application of the Audience Test
The only valid judge of whether one video game infringes an-
other is the intended audience for those games.220 Accordingly,
courts should evaluate video game copyright infringement claims
from the perspective of the average video game player. The Sev-
enth Circuit in North American Philips recognized the utility of
using the audience test to determine whether two video games are
substantially similar when it stated that the stimulation of play,
which is the "main attraction" of a video game, prevents consum-
ers from focusing on minor artistic differences. 2 1 Unfortunately,
the Seventh Circuit failed to carry this reasoning to its logical con-
clusion when it held that the differences in the way two games play
are important in a substantial similarity analysis only to the extent
that they affect the way a player visually perceives the two
games.22 The Seventh Circuit's exclusive focus on "ocular" simi-
larities between two games in determining substantial similarity23
seems clearly improper.
Certain video games have achieved widespread popularity be-
cause their unique video graphics, combined with the skill and en-
ergy they demand from game players, create an exhilarating game
playing experience. Thus, a substantial similarity inquiry should
search for similarities between two games in both perceivable vide-
ographical characteristics and game play. The concept of game
play in a video game is analogous to the concept of mood or tone in
a movie or story. For example, just as a movie producer, using the
same sequence of events, could create two completely different
movies by altering the setting, tone, dialogue, and characters, a
video game designer, using very similar videographical features,
could create two completely different games by making them play
differently. The district court in Amusement World224 focused on
the difference in game play between Asteroids and Meteors in
holding that the two games were not substantially similar. The
court primarily reasoned that Meteors played faster and was more
difficult than Asteroids.225
220. See supra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 195.
222. 672 F.2d at 619.
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Atari, Inc. v.
Amusement World, Inc.
225. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 229. The court stated,
"The overall 'feel' of the way the games play is different .... [T]he player's spaceship han-
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To ascertain the differences in play between the two video
games in a copyright infringement suit, the factfinder actually
should play the video games under consideration. Although the
idea of federal judges and jury members playing video games dur-
ing an infringement trial seems comical, this method of comparing
two works is analogous to factfinders watching a movie or listening
to a song to experience the total concept and feel of the works at
issue. The economic structure of copyright law demands no less.
Otherwise, copyright law's goal of protecting an author's legal right
to the financial rewards his original work generates will go unreal-
ized.2 2' Thus, both the game play and the visual graphic features of
a video game are important aspects of the game's protectible ex-
pression and deserve joint and balanced attention in a substantial
similarity analysis.
D. Future Video Game Litigation
The appropriateness of using a movie model to determine
whether two video games are substantially similar will increase as
video games become more complicated. While the Atari cases dealt
with video games consisting of one graphical display mode, video
game designers currently are creating many new games that have
several successive sequences of different videographic displays
presenting different types of action. These complex multi-screen
games should prompt courts to analyze the sequences of game
events and the interaction of game characters in determining
whether two games are substantially similar.
Game designers rapidly are improving the quality of vide-
ographical images in video games. This trend in the video game
industry, however, may prove to be a double-edged sword in copy-
right infringement actions. As video game characters become more
graphically distinct and complex, courts probably will grant them
stronger copyright protection from infringing games. If courts con-
tinue to focus on minor visual graphic details in comparing games
for substantial similarity, however, video game infringers will be
dles differently and fires differently. 'Meteors' is faster-paced at all stages and is considera-
bly more difficult than 'Asteroids.'" Id. at 230.
The decision in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), does
not diminish the argument that a court should consider speed and other play characteristics
when adjudicating a video infringement action. The Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that
circuit boards that increase the speed of a video game's play are illegal derivative works. A
different speed of play alone does not prevent a video game from infringing another work;
however, neither do cosmetic videographic similarities.
226. See supra note 100.
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able to avoid liability more easily by altering cosmetic videographic
features of the copied game that do not significantly affect the
game's play, which is the primary attraction of video games to
consumers.
The rapid development of more complex and sophisticated
video games should prompt courts to grant video games protection
from games that are substantially but not literally similar. The
growing variety of games that express differently identical underly-
ing ideas debunks the notions that a video game's idea is expressi-
ble in only a limited number of ways and that most games are sim-
ilar in idea only. Furthermore, as the market offers greater
financial reward to creators of successful video games, the manu-
facturers undoubtedly will test the boundary between imitation
and infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts in copyright infringement actions have demonstrated a
tendency to focus on only visual videographical similarities and
differences between video games in their substantial similarity
analyses. This approach exacerbates several difficult analytical
problems in copyright infringement litigation. First, this approach
will cause courts to distinguish improperly between a video game's
unprotectible idea and protectible expressions. A video game's con-
crete expressions, which include its visual sequence of events, set
of interacting characters, and artistic videographic scenes and ef-
fects, deserve protection from games that are nonliteral but sub-
stantially similar copies because finding infringement only for lit-
eral similarity between two games improperly narrows the scope of
copyright protection. Second, judicial focus only on visual vide-
ographic game features will cause courts to undertake an incom-
plete substantial similarity analysis. Because consumers financially
reward video game authors for creating games that present enter-
taining videographical displays and provide an exciting and chal-
lenging game playing experience, courts should compare both game
play and visual videographical features to determine whether two
video games are substantially similar. Thus, by granting video
games protection from nonliteral copying and focusing on both
game play and visual videographical game features to determine
whether two video games are substantially similar, courts will more
accurately analyze video game infringement cases and more effec-
tively serve the goals of the Copyright Act.
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